Introduction
Over the past decade, the traditional corporate network has come under siege from a proliferation of viruses and malicious intruders. As a result, numerous network security technologies, methodologies, and policies have been developed to secure the business system. In comparison, process control systems, with their reliance on proprietary networks and hardware, have long been considered immune to cyber attacks. Now, with the move to open standards such as Ethernet, TCP/IP, and web technologies, the plant floor requires its own security procedures to eliminate undesirable access to production systems and to maximize the uptime and efficiency of process networks 1 .
Web-based Automated Process Control systems are a new type of applications that use the Internet to control industrial processes with the access to the real-time data.
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (e.g., electricity, natural gas, gasoline, water, waste treatment, transportation) to all Americans. As such, they are part of the nation's critical infrastructure and require protection from a variety of threats that exist in cyber space today. By allowing the collection and analysis of data and control of equipment such as pumps and valves from remote locations, SCADA networks provide great efficiency and are widely used 2 .
IEEE Standard 1402-2000, Guide for Electric
Power Substation Physical and Electronic Security, states:
"The introduction of computer systems with online access to substation information is significant in that substation relay protection, control, and data collection systems may be exposed to the same vulnerabilities as all other computer systems. computer equipment within the substation environment increases, the need for security systems to prevent electronic intrusions may become even more important."
It is fortunate, that vulnerabilities of computer systems are well known and well documented. However, it is important to successfully apply that knowledge to industrial networks. Figure 1 . presents electronic intrusion vulnerabilities for industrial networks.
Over the last 20 years, there were increasingly more complex, sophisticated, and capable control systems installed. These have included more sophisticated basic and advanced regulatory control, advanced process control, optimizers, and artificial intelligence 3 . The field of intelligent instrumentation is going through a major transition.
The first "smart" transmitters were pioneered by just a few companies some 15 years ago.
After a rather slow start in the market, one can say that in the past five years, this technology has finally received acceptance in the plant instrumentation and maintenance communities. some suggestions on how to properly deal with industrial security issues; some possible solutions will also be presented.
Identifying Threats and Risks
Web-based control systems are becoming more used with everyday and the onlinebased network control systems create more possibilities for intruders to invade a network control system. Internet technologies such as RSView32 by Rockwell Automation, LabView by National Instruments 6 are providing great applications for control networks. However, it is necessary to mention that the network and data integrity are not the primary concern of those software packages.
Motivations for electronic attacks against web-based control systems may follow the same patterns seen in attacks on Internet E-commerce sites. They can be categorized into five broad groups 7 :
1. Hackers are computer users who access unauthorized systems simply because they can. The relatively benign hacker is motivated by curiosity or the challenge of exploration, without overt malicious intent. Others are malicious with the intent of gaining notoriety or causing damage.
2.
Espionage is the act of gaining industrial or political advantage by information gathering through both legal and illegal means. Much espionage gathers information through publicly available resources such as web pages, product descriptions, and promotional literature. Other espionage activities include insider access, theft, and illegal surveillance to acquire confidential information.
6 Software packages that allow engineers control and view control or device networks via WWW. The following presents an example of threats identified for electric power systems 8 :
1. The expanded use of public protocols to interconnect protective equipment and SCADA systems (e.g. TCP/IP and UCA over Ethernet LANs/WANs).
2. Increased dial-in and network access to remote sites through public communication services (e.g., public phones, Internet).
3. Instability in the electric power utility job market, creating disgruntled employees and ex-employees, caused by deregulation and mergers.
4. Increased competition for electricity generation and T&D services creating pressure to downsize, streamline, automate and cut costs, also causing disgruntled employees and ex-employees.
5. Instability in the electric power service, caused by deregulation and increased competition, creating disgruntled customers.
6. Increased public access to transmission system data mandated by FERC 888/889.
7. Increased terrorism worldwide and increased foreign government-sponsored terrorism and information warfare targeted against North America.
8. Rapid growth of a computer-literate population and widespread dissemination of hacker tools.
9. Increased electronic theft, recreational hacking, and hacktivism (i.e., the destruction of electronic assets for a political or socioeconomic cause).
Federal Bureau of Investigation also identified some threats of critical infrastructure that are presented in Table 1 . Resulting consequences of a possible intrusion of industrial or SCADA network could be as follows 9 :
• Shut down the substation or any portion of the subsystem controlled by the compromised device, either immediately or in a delayed manner.
• Change protection device settings to degrade reliability of the device and, subsequently, the electric service provided by the substation.
• Gather control and protection settings information that could be used in a subsequent attack. • Change or perturb the data in such a manner as to degrade electric service or cause loss of service.
• Plant malicious code that could later trigger a delayed or coordinated attack.
• Shut down the regional service controlled by that SCADA system, either immediately or in a delayed manner.
• Steal or alter metering data gathered by the SCADA system.
• Use the SCADA system as a backdoor into the corporate IT system to obtain customer credit and personal identity information commonly used in electronic theft.
Development of security procedures for industrial control networks
In order to successfully protect industrial control networks, E. Byres and G. Gillespie suggest protecting control network integrity by starting not from technology, but from creation of an industrial cyber security policy. The authors of the article "Plan for Network
Security 10 " present the following characteristics of a typical industrial cyber security policy:
• Establish a secure production communication infrastructure and a stable processing environment.
• Effectively manage the risk of security exposure and intrusion.
• Communicate the responsibilities of users, management, and information system staff for the protection of information and provide direction toward honoring this commitment.
• Provide a requirements outline for those staff charged with technical implementation.
• Promote understanding and compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. • Limit company liability and preserve management's options in the event of a security incident.
The responsibility for an industrial cyber security policy should reside at the highest organizational structure. Below that should be a production-based technical team charged with standards implementation, technical management, and enforcement. The consistent application of the security policy will reduce the risk and liability of all persons involved 11 .
US Department of Energy suggest following these 21 steps to improve industrial control network security 12 :
1. Identify all connections to SCADA networks 2. Disconnect unnecessary connections to the SCADA network 3. Evaluate and strengthen the security of any remaining connections to the SCADA network 4. Harden SCADA networks by removing or disabling unnecessary services.
5. Do not rely on proprietary protocols to protect your system. 6. Implement the security features provided by device and system vendors 7. Establish strong controls over any medium that is used as a backdoor into the SCADA network.
8. Implement internal and external intrusion detection systems and establish 24-hour-aday incident monitoring. 11. Establish SCADA "Red Teams" to identify and evaluate possible attack scenarios.
12. Clearly define cyber security roles, responsibilities, and authorities for managers, system administrators, and users 13. Document network architecture and identify systems that serve critical functions or contain sensitive information that require additional levels of protection.
14. Establish a rigorous, ongoing risk management process.
15. Establish a network protection strategy based on the principle of defense-in-depth.
16. Clearly identify cyber security requirements 17. Establish effective configuration management processes 18. Conduct routine self-assessments 19. Establish system backups and disaster recovery plans.
20. Senior organizational leadership should establish expectations for cyber security performance and hold individuals accountable for their performance 21. Establish policies and conduct training to minimize the likelihood that organizational personnel will inadvertently disclose sensitive information regarding SCADA system design, operations, or security controls.
In comparison to business IT security, it might seem that there are no clear security guidelines developed for SCADA and web-based control networks. However, general suggestions given here could be extremely useful for each particular industry.
Recommendations and Conclusions
Jonathan Pollet argues, that SCADA security is often overlooked 13 :
Now, more than ever, utilities and oil and gas producers are taking precautions to ensure the security of their information systems, implementing protections for known potential points of access via the Internet. The problem lies in the fact that many SCADA systems involve various components that bridge the world between IT and Facility Engineering. There is typically not a lot of teamwork and collaboration between the IT security efforts and the Data Acquisition teams that are focused on delivering field and facility data reliably to company stockholders and end users.
Everyone assumes that it is an IT issue, but IT staffs are rarely have the expertise and background in SCADA and industrial automation systems to adequately develop security tests or measures for these systems.
A survey by Riptech found that about 70 percent of the operating manuals for those systems are available to the public. These systems for the process industries are particularly vulnerable because they were not designed for use with Internet applications.
The White House report on critical infrastructure protection recommends the three following steps to secure network-based infrastructure 14 :
"We suggest consideration of these immediate actions prior to the completion of a formal risk assessment:
(1) Isolate critical control systems from insecure networks by disconnection or adequate firewalls, • Researching and developing new security technologies to protect control systems.
• Developing security policies, guidance, and standards for control system security. For example, the use of consensus standards could be considered to encourage industry to invest in stronger security for control systems.
• 13 more secure architecture might be attained by segmenting control networks with robust firewalls and strong authentication. Also, organizations may benefit from educating management about the cybersecurity risks related to control systems and sharing successful practices related to working across organizational boundaries.
• Implementing effective security management programs that include consideration of control system security. We have previously reported on the security management practices of leading organizations. Such programs typically consider risk assessment, development of appropriate policies and procedures, employee awareness, and regular security monitoring.
For standardizing purposes, there are several organizations that perform security testing and evaluation of SCADA and control networks. The security management necessary for the measures defined in the security concept requires clearly defined responsibilities -in other words, the special security tasks to be performed by each and every staff member have to be clearly defined.
Implementing the Security Measures
The measures selected are put into practice during the implementation phase on the basis of the previously defined security policy and the security concept.
Implementations of this kind are rarely ready-made, but represent a customized solution in each individual case which takes account of the special requirements of the company. This ensures that the security solution can be harmoniously integrated into the existing infrastructure and the associated system architecture. Nevertheless, it may 16 Siemens, Information Security in Industrial Communications, October 1999 be necessary, despite this, to adjust individual business and/or communication processes and to redesign them to comply with the security policy. In a few cases, even restrictions or additional effort and cost may be the result.
Security Consciousness and Training of Staff Members
The success of all the actions taken towards information security to date is highly dependent upon the attitude of the different staff members. Without the active support of all the persons concerned within the company, it will barely be possible to achieve the specified security objectives. Both decision-makers and all other staff members should therefore be induced to be security-conscious. Suitable means for achieving this are regular security information meetings and specific training sessions.
Control and Monitoring
So that a specified security level can be guaranteed permanently, the measures introduced and compliance with the security guidelines have to be monitored and controlled at regular intervals. This is the only way of eliminating existing gaps in security and detecting potential risks.
In conclusion, it is important to point out the uniqueness of the security of web-based industrial networks and SCADA networks. It is obvious, that there are potential threats and risks associated with industrial control networks. The battle for IT security must go on, especially when dealing with security of industrial control networks.
